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Abstract 
 
From the time when women's rights were not placed high on the 
agenda of any state to the time when women's rights are given 
top priority, Tunisia's gender-friendly legislation requires a 
fresher look. One would be forgiven for thinking that Tunisia's 
reforms started after they gained independence from France in 
the 1950's. In fact, it was during the French Protectorate that 
reformers started rumours of reform, arguing amongst other 
issues for affording women more rights than those they were 
granted under sharia law, which governed family law in Tunisia. 
After gaining its independence, Tunisia promulgated the Code 
of Personal Status, which was considered a radical departure 
from the sharia. It is considered to be the first women-friendly 
legislation promulgated in the country. It could be argued that 
Tunisian family law underwent, four waves of reform. The first 
wave started during the French Protectorate. The second wave 
started in the 1950's with the codification of Tunisia's family law, 
which introduced women-friendly legislation. The third wave 
started in the 1990's with changes to the Code of Personal 
Status, and the latest wave commenced in 2010. In this article, 
I analyse the initial, pioneering phases of the reforms resulting 
from the actions of a newly formed national state interested in 
building a free society at the end of colonial rule, as well as 
reforms that have taken place in the modern state since the Arab 
uprising in Tunisia. As a result of the various waves of reforms, 
I argue that Tunisia should be seen as the vanguard of women-
friendly legislation in the Arab world. 
Keywords 
Islam; women; family law; Code of Personal Status; Tunisia. 
………………………………………………………. 
Pioneer in peer-reviewed,  








24 March 2017 
Date Revised 
22 May 2019 
Date Accepted 
29 May 2019 
Date published 
24 October 2019 
Editor Prof O Fuo 
How to cite this article 
Booley A "Progressive Realisation 
of Muslim Family Law:  
The Case of Tunisia" PER / PELJ 







Progressive Realisation of Muslim Family Law: 
The Case of Tunisia 
A Booley* Online ISSN 
1727-3781 
A BOOLEY  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  2 
1  Introduction 
Before independence, Tunisian society was based on the concept of the 
family and relied on behavioural attitudes stemming from a strong loyalty to 
one's social grouping and class, to the point that governing bodies were 
formed along those lines.1 The traditional Tunisian family was socially 
“central” in so far as the greater part of social dynamics were centred on it.2 
Objectively, the major articulations of society were lineages.3 The state was 
formed by one of these lineages, and the group tended to be organised like 
a family.4 For the individual, the family was the group to which the individual 
owed life, identity, and social legitimacy. It was the outlet for the individual’s 
needs and the mediator, if not the sphere of application, of the individual’s 
values. Symbolically, this appeared to be the most plausible model of social 
relationships, patriarchalis, and it thus became the form of social relations 
extending far beyond the domestic situation from which it derived its name.5 
Thus, when the individual considered the world outside the domestic group, 
everything referred the individual back to the family.6 
As time progressed, the Middle East and North African (MENA) regions 
developed family codes that governed issues of personal status, which 
included marriage, divorce, child custody, maintenance and inheritance. In 
terms of marriage, these family codes usually address issues such as 
marital contracts, guardianship, the maintenance of the family, and the age 
of the parties. In terms of divorce the codes addressed the reasons for 
divorce, custody issues and the procedure.7 They superseded family codes 
which were not always friendly towards women, especially relating to 
marriage and divorce. It may be argued that some of the previous family 
practices had lacked gender equality and the overall improvement of gender 
relations. The new codes could be viewed as a break from the then status 
quo. 
Where Islam is the dominant religion very few nations can boast that the 
realisation and protection of women's rights and gender friendly relations 
are on top of their priority list. Tunisia and historically Turkey occupy 
progressive positions amongst Arab and Middle Eastern nations in terms of 
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the progressive realisation and protection of women’s rights in marriage and 
divorce.8 Other Muslim states are beginning to become more aware and 
progressive in their realisation of women's rights, and this is to be 
complimented. 
However, the realisation and protection of women’s rights and the protection 
of gender-friendly relations can be traced back to the period before the 
codification of family law, to the role played by the early reforms in the Mena 
region. It could be argued that the early reforms created an atmosphere in 
which the realisation and protection of women's rights gathered momentum 
in placing women at the centre of the debate on the progressive realisation 
of women's rights. In the case of Tunisia the overall improvement of 
women's rights can be associated with the role played by those early 
reformers, although factors such as the policy of modernisation,9 under 
Tunisia's first post-independence President, Habib Bourguiba, a Western 
educated nationalist, cannot be excluded.10 
The codification of Muslim family law and certain of its provisions, especially 
in countries where Islam is the dominant faith, is a subject of great 
complexity and gives rise to heated debates. I argue that Tunisia's family 
law has consistently undergone transformation, favouring women’s rights in 
the areas of marriage and divorce. 
This article will be divided into the following sections. Section one will argue 
the important role played by the early reformers in creating a liberal 
atmosphere in which the rights of women were championed, before as well 
as under the French Protectorate. Section two will demonstrate that once 
independence had been attained, Muslim family law became a priority 
(amongst others) for the modernisation of Tunisia, of which women were 
the standard bearers. Section three will highlight briefly the improvements 
that took place after the Arab Spring, when women were again the standard 
bearers for women-friendly legislation. I thus argue that Tunisia can be 
viewed as one of the most progressive Muslim countries in promulgating 
women-friendly legislation. 
2  Early reformers  
The realisation and protection of women's rights within the MENA region 
date back as early as the 19th century. Reformists such as Mohamed Abdu, 
Abdel Aziz Thalbi al-Din Al Afghani and Ibn Abi Al Diaf held the belief that 
the cause of the socio-economic deficit in most Muslim states could be 
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attributed in part to the position of women, who in most Muslim states 
occupy a position inferior to that of men.11 These reformists proceeded with 
extreme caution with regard to certain existing Islamic structures, attempting 
to raise the status of women within an Islamic context.12 The aim was to 
proceed with reforms without alienating Islam's primary sources, such as 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah,13 so as not to be accused of westernising the 
Arab state, its people and culture. These reformers started by defending 
Islam and the rights of women in a liberal sense, by referring to the primary 
texts, emphasising that the wives of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH)14 were 
educated in reading and writing, and were able to negotiate various 
transactions.15 
Several North African jurists embarked upon the task of improving the 
inferior position of women which was prevalent in many North African and 
Middle Eastern nations. According to the anthropologist Khedher, the 
emancipation of women was not high on the agenda of any Muslim state 
(historically with the exception of Turkey). This general statement included 
Tunisia as it was during the French Protectorate.16 Mohamed Abdu and 
                                            
11  Khedher 2017 JIWS 30-37. 
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Western legal codes. In addition, the broad body of Islamic law known as the 
shari'ah, makes no distinction between secular and sacred. Following the demise of 
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), religious schools of jurisprudence started to take on 
the role of interpreting and expounding on the Qur'an and the sunnah in an effort to 
help Muslims conform to the dictates of the shari'ah. The four dominant religious 
schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence that emerged were the Maliki, Shafi, Hanafi 
and Hanbali. Each school developed a systematic approach for dealing with the 
areas of law not covered by Qur'an and the sunnah. Although each of the dominant 
schools of thought emphasised the Islamic sources differently, they all agreed on the 
most fundamental principles. Only about eighty verses are concrete legal 
pronouncements. However, those verses did introduce the amelioration of existing 
customary rules relating to various criminal offences, polygamy and divorce, and the 
standing of women was improved to a certain degree in areas such as inheritance 
(thereby giving women a formal status). Madhhab means the path or way followed. 
This term is usually translated into English as "school" - as an intellectual school. It 
consists of a group of jurists loyal to the collective doctrine and specific methodology 
worked out by the school and attributed to the school's eponym. 
14  It customary to put the following abbreviation after the name of Prophet Mohammed 
- Peace and Blessings upon Him (PBUH). This applies to all prophets that came 
before Mohammed. 
15  Khedher 2017 JIWS 30-37. 
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Qasim Amin frequently lectured about the rights of women within an Islamic 
framework. Qasim Amin published books titled The Liberation of Women 
and The New Woman, which many viewed as points of departure in Egypt 
concerning the status of women.17 In these works he advocates the 
emancipation of women as an important step in the modernisation of the 
Arab world, which needed the support it would receive from providing 
women with access to education and socio-economic opportunities.18 
The Tunisian scholar and Imaam (meaning a Muslim cleric) Shayk 
Muhammad Snoussi published The Flower's Blooming, in which the author 
emphasised the place of women in an Islamic context and stressed the 
importance of education for young Tunisian girls.19 Later in the same period 
one of a group of intellectuals, Abdelazziz Thaalbi, published a text titled 
The Koran's Liberal Spirit that argued for young Tunisian girls to be 
educated, and against the wearing of the veil and the seclusion of women, 
as these traditions presented a serious obstacle against social progress in 
Tunisia.20 It could be argued that these early reformers created a liberal 
atmosphere which ignited the interest of other intellectuals in publishing 
articles about the plight of Tunisian women.21 Most of these writings 
advocated the education of girls (there is no conclusive consensus that 
“education” in these texts referred to higher education or Islamic education) 
and dealt with the contentious issue of the veil.22 
Several of these articles were written and published by a Tunisian political 
activist, Tahar Haddad, who studied at the Al Zeitouna mosque.23 As a 
member of the Destour Party, Haddad was determined to find alternative 
routes to advance the position of women and workers in Tunisian society 
during this period.24 Haddad argued that Islam was not oppressive to 
women but rather actually improved the status of women when compared 
with their pre-Islamic conditions by protecting them and guaranteeing their 
basic rights. Haddad criticised practices such as veiling, polygamy, 
arranged marriages and repudiation, the husband's unfettered prerogative, 
                                            
17  Sonneveld 2017 Religion and Gender 90-93. 
18  Khedher 2017 JIWS 30-37. 
19  Khedher 2017 JIWS 30-37. 
20  Khedher 2017 JIWS 30-37. 
21  Sonneveld 2017 Religion and Gender 90-93. 
22  Sonneveld 2017 Religion and Gender 90-93. 
23  A case in point is the establishment of the Al-Zaytuna Mosque, which was later 
transformed into a university. Founded as a madrassa (a learning school) in the early 
8th century, the school flourished in the Middle Ages not only as a religious university. 
Along with theology, mainly the Qur'an, the university taught jurisprudence, history, 
grammar, science and medicine. Al-Zaytuna was considered on a par with Cairo's 
Al-Azhar University in terms of being recognised as a leading Islamic educational 
institution, although this judgement is debated amongst various scholars. 
24  Weideman 2016 IJMES 47-65. 
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known in Islam as talaq, as infringing on the rights of women.25 The Zeitouna 
administration condemned his last work, titled Imra' tuna fi al-Shari´a wa-l-
Mujtama (Our Women in Shari'a and in Society) as heretical.26 His diploma 
(tatwi) was confiscated and various Tunisian scholars learned in religion 
(ulama) published rebuttals of his works. In addition, various journalists and 
Destour Party officials also denounced his works.27 It may be argued that 
Haddad's writings in a way created a positive atmosphere that propelled 
women to contribute significantly to their homeland. However, this was not 
sufficient to create a solid foundation for the emergence of a women's 
movement aimed at achieving gender equality.28 In 1936 the first women's 
organisation, Union Musulmane des Femmes de Tunisie (UMFT) emerged 
to promote women's education, following the ideas of Haddad. It was joined 
by nationalist leaders and was used as an instrument to co-ordinate national 
resistance against the French, in order to attain independence.29 Sadly, in 
almost all these instances the Tunisian national movement did not prioritise 
the status of women in society. This featured only later, in the development 
of Tunisia as a whole.30 Although the book made Haddad a pariah, one can 
argue that he strongly influenced gender relations and later reforms in family 
law.31 Haddad died in 1935 at the age of 36, and it has been suggested that 
his demise was due to stress.32 
3  Tunisia's family law pre-independence 
Towards the end of the tenth century of the Christian Era (CE) the Tunisian 
population largely converted to Islam.33 The inhabitants of the North African 
region were of Arab-Berber descent, speaking either Arabic or a Berber 
dialect.34 Modern day Tunisia was a French protectorate from 1881 until 
195635 and, together with Algeria and Morocco, these states share a sense 
of solidarity through their relationship with France, a foreign, non-Muslim 
state.36 
                                            
25  Weideman 2016 IJMES 47-65. 
26  Weideman 2016 IJMES 47-65. 
27  Weideman 2016 IJMES 47-65. 
28  Women activists, such as Bchira Ben Mrad, chose to concentrate their efforts on 
liberating their country from the French, participating in demonstrations, and getting 
arrested along with their male comrades. 
29  Other NGO's were established, like the Union des Jeunes Filles de Tunisia (UFT). 
30  Brand Women, the State, and Political Liberalization 323. 
31  Conover-Crockett 2015 https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2194/ 10. 
32  Weideman 2016 IJMES 47-65. 
33  Katz 2018 JNAS 1-4. 
34  Catroux 1954 International Journal 282. 
35  Angrist 1999 CSSH 730-757. 
36  Catroux 1954 International Journal 283. 
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The particular practice of Islam developed in Tunisian society was based on 
kin groupings that allowed male members of the group to have almost 
complete control over women.37 The shariah, as inspired by the Maliki and 
Hanafi schools of religious thought, was particularly important to the 
exercise of this type of control.38 These two schools of thought also 
sanctioned a special bond especially amongst the male members of the 
extended kin group.39 The combined power of the husband and his male kin 
over women's lives, referred to by Charrad as "kin-based patriarchy",40 
represented a particular form of subordination and control that women 
experienced in Tunisia and in most Arab and Middle Eastern states.41 
Some of these practices included adherence to all the restrictions affecting 
the legal status of women.42 For example, there was no minimum age for 
marriage, except for the stipulation that marriage should take place after 
puberty.43 In addition, the actual ceremony that confirmed the marital 
contract was attended by the father, or in his absence by the male guardian, 
who uttered the consent to the marriage, because in most instances the 
bride was not present.44 Omri, a legal scholar, argues that for a person 
steeped in European culture the thought of marriage in absentia, without 
approval from the bride, is absurd. However, such marriages were common 
before the introduction of the CPS as well as other Muslim and non-Muslim 
states, where there was a Muslim population.45 
Polygamy was not introduced by Islam nor was it part of an Islamic 
phenomenon.46 Polygamy was allowed in pre-independence Tunisia, and 
the husband could be married to as many as four wives at a time,47 although 
in reality only a small minority of men could afford having more than one 
wife.48 The justification of the practice was found in the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah, being the primary sources of Islam. Although only a few practised 
polygamy, it could be argued that that the legality of polygamy had the 
                                            
37  Charrad 2007 Wash & Lee L Rev 1521. 
38  Charrad 2007 Wash & Lee L Rev 1521. 
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RW-Islamic-persepctive-on-CM.pdf 1-15. 
44  Islamic Relief 2018 https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ 
IRW-Islamic-persepctive-on-CM.pdf 1-15. 
45  Omri 2004 Journal of Policy Studies 147. 
46  For example, polygyny was exercised by Babylonians, Greeks, Persians, and Arabs. 
Furthermore, many pre-Islamic religions (for example, Judaism) accepted polygyny 
amongst their practices. It was the practice of all prophets [PBUH] excluding Jesus 
Christ [PBUH]. 
47  Ali The Holy Qurʼān Chapter IV, verse 6.  
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A BOOLEY  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  8 
potential of threatening women and pressured them into compliance with 
the husband's wishes. There could have been other factors that could have 
the same potential for example, socio-economic reasons. No matter  the 
reasons, polygamy was and is perhaps today still an obstacle for women to 
achieve true gender equality and gender relations. This was common 
practice in most Muslim states at that time and even though the practice of 
polygamy still continues in a few Muslim states today, it does so under 
certain conditions and with various stipulations.49 
In terms of the dominant school of religious thought (in Tunisia), the Maliki 
school, repudiation by the husband required only the presence of two 
witnesses. No judicial intervention was required.50 The witnesses were to 
be males. The wife had no judicial recourse.51 According to Charrad, the 
only recourse the wife had was to turn to her family or community to 
approach the husband to request that he not repudiate her.52 Without 
judicial intervention the wife was in a vulnerable situation, as there was no 
protection for her wellbeing or even her children. However, women could 
appeal to a religious judge and ask for a divorce. This could be granted only 
on highly limited grounds.53 Stilt and Gandhavadi, scholars of history, put 
forward that according to the Mailiki school of thought, a wife could obtain a 
judicial divorce for abandonment and lack of financial and material support 
from her husband for various reasons including certain categories of harm 
and injury.54 
In Haddad's book, the Imaraatuna Fi Al Sharia Wa Al Mujtamaa (Our 
Women in the Sharia and in Society), the second section provides a lonely 
picture of the situation of women in Tunisia, with illustrations drawn from the 
author’s own experiences when he visited the courts in Tunisia. He states, 
"I went in person to our Shari'a courts to ascertain if there was statistical 
data telling about marriages and divorces and I found that they did not 
exist."55 Two types of courts existed in Tunisia, namely the secular courts 
and the shariah courts/tribunals. Family law remained the domain of Muslim 
judges (qadis), who adjudicated through Tunisia's traditional system of 
Islamic jurisprudence based on either the Maliki or Hanafi religious school 
                                            
49  Western 2008 A F L Rev 81-135. 
50  Charrad 2007 Wash & Lee L Rev 1521. 
51  Charrad 2007 Wash & Lee L Rev 1521. 
52  Charrad 2007 Wash & Lee L Rev 1521. 
53  Charrad 2007 Wash & Lee L Rev 1521. 
54  Stilt and Gandhavadi 2011 https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=facultyworkingpapers 1-34. 
55  Khedher 2017 JIWS 30-37. 
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of thought, whereas the rest of Tunisia's legal system was subject to existing 
or recently published codes introduced by the French.56 
The French colonial officials refrained from interfering with the prevailing 
Islamic law, although other laws, such as those pertaining to contracts and 
property, were amended for economic and political reasons.57 The French 
were very aware that any interference with Tunisia's Islamic family law could 
lead to social disorder, particularly as Tunisians viewed Islam as the 
cornerstone that both separated and distinguished their identity from the 
French. As a result, Islamic family law in Tunisia was left intact, serving as 
a point of differentiation between Tunisia and France. Charrad also 
suggests that Islamic family law was left untouched for political reasons.58 
In nations where colonialism has taken place, the personal law of the 
inhabitants is normally left intact, as there is no benefit to be gained by 
altering those laws. 
4  Tunisia's family law post-independence Code of 
Personal Status, 1956  
Habib Bourguiba, a lawyer, led the feminist movement, which also included 
partisans of the New Constitutional Liberal Party (referred to as Neo 
Destour) and supported an integrated and unified national struggle against 
the French Protectorate. The alliance between leading factions of the 
nationalist movement disintegrated after the French were pushed out of 
Tunisia in the mid-1950s. On the eve of independence from the French a 
conflict developed between two major nationalist factions, on the one hand 
a group supporting modernization, and on the other a group holding on to 
the traditional practices.59 These factions had contrasting views of the 
Islamic establishment and kin-based groupings. 
Bouguiba's faction was the ultimate winner and drew its constituents from 
the urban areas and the workers’ union. The competing faction, led by Ben 
Youseff, found support amongst the kin-based communities in rural areas, 
including the members of the religious establishment.60 As the conflict 
intensified, Bourguiba asked for French help. The French agreed to help, as 
their colonial rule was eroding sharply and they preferred that a sovereign 
Tunisia should be under the leadership of Bourguiba rather than that of Ben 
Youseff.61 The Tunisian nationalist movement ended with the termination of 
the French Protectorate and the realisation of Tunisian independence on 
                                            
56  Zeghal "Implicit Sharia" 107-130. 
57  Charrad 1990 Middle East Report 1-34. 
58  Charrad "Family Law Reforms in the Arab World". 
59  Anderson 1958 ICLQ 262-279. 
60  Charrad 1997 Social Politics 284. 
61  Charrad 1997 Social Politics 284. 
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March 20 1956. It came as no surprise that Bourguiba was its first 
president.62 
Personal law systems are legal systems in which a different body of law is 
applied to various communities in the same country.63 These legal systems 
are based on factors such as ethnicity or religious affiliations and normally 
regulate matters of family law.64 The issue of gender equality in a Tunisian 
context has been pertinent for some time, albeit with little or no substantial 
progress. It was only after Tunisia's independence from French colonial rule 
that Bourguiba came to make substantial changes to family law, which were 
promulgated through the Code of Personal Status in 1956.65 The Code of 
Personal Status (CPS) was enacted only six months after independence 
and is considered as a monumental step towards the modernisation of 
Tunisia. The CPS was introduced as law on January 1, 1957, and 
represented a forward-thinking reform imposed from above, attached to the 
executive branch.66 It is true that the CPS applies only to Tunisian Muslims. 
French Law regulates the personal status of Christians, while Jewish 
citizens have their own code.67 
Although the drafting of the CPS involved lawyers and religious leaders, 
there seems not to have been any involvement of women in the process. 
This seems at odds with the realisation that the gender issue had been 
ongoing for decades in Tunisia, being foregrounded by various reformers 
as well as the emergence of women's movements, as discussed earlier. The 
CPS was considered complementary to the larger state-building 
programme that was targeted towards a modern centralised state and 
efforts to diffuse tribalism, classism and kin-based communities in the rural 
and urban areas.68 In addition, the CPS was part of the so-called "war 
against underdevelopment". This strategy included doing away with 
whatever the government deemed to be impediments against the creation 
of the modern state. Such impediments could include kin-based corporate 
communities and patriarchal arrangements permitted by the shari'ah, all of 
which were deemed as hampering the process of nation building.69 In a 
speech delivered by Bourguiba relating to marriage and consent, he stated: 
It is inadmissible, I am sorry to say, that parents constrain their son to marry 
a young woman chosen for their convenience. We have in this respect strange 
practices. There are the young women who have been 'promised' to a young 
                                            
62  McCarthy 2014 JNAS 737. 
63  Tagari 2012 Int J L C 231-252. 
64  Tagari 2012 Int J L C 231-252. 
65  Weideman 2016 IJMES 47-65. 
66  Charrad 1997 Social Politics 284-286. 
67  Sfeir 1957 Middle East J 309-318. 
68  Charrad 2007 Wash & Lee L Rev 1521. 
69  Charrad 1997 Social Politics 284-286.  
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man for a long time. There are the female cousins, the female relatives with 
various degrees of kinship closeness, a whole series of young women to 
marry off … . Let's leave the decision to the husband and wife-to-be.70 
Tunisia was dominated by the Islamic faith, and Bourguiba continuously 
defended Tunisia's Islamic legacy by stating that CPS was based on the 
Maliki school of religious thought or the part that related to family law. He 
claimed that the CPS did not change what was considered halal 
(permissible) or haram (not permissible).71 Scholars such as Weideman and 
Ganna, when addressing the CPS and in particular its spirit, argue that it is 
unmatched in the Muslim world, except perhaps by the 1924 Turkish Civil 
Code. Furthermore, the CPS did not altogether abolish the shariah, nor did 
it proceed to mimic the European model under the leadership of Ataturk.72 
The CPS is made up of the following books: Al Zawaj (marriage), Al Talaq 
(divorce), Al Nafaqa (alimony), Al Hadhana (child custody), Al Nasab 
(determination of parenthood), Al Laqit (abandoned children), Al Mafqud 
(missing persons) and Al Mirath (inheritance).73 Each of them includes a 
number of articles reconstituting the legal status of women family law, for 
example. 
Book 1 addresses the requirements for a marriage to be deemed valid. Of 
importance is the requirement that consent must be obtained from both 
parties to the marriage, in front of two worthy witnesses, which makes the 
1956 CPS gender neutral.74 The dower (mahr) payable to the wife must be 
specified.75 It could be argued that in 1956 the CPS put an end to the 
popular practice of arranged and perhaps forced marriages that could have 
existed during the period of colonialism, although such practices took place 
privately without the authorities being made aware.76 In addition, the CPS 
sought to prevent arranged and forced marriages by taking away the 
authority of the father and/or guardian, which could perpetuate the 
abovementioned practices.77 The promulgation of the CPS made marriage 
a voluntary and consensual union, and the courts had the authority to end 
it, thereby curtailing the unilateral repudiation of the male.78  
                                            
70  Charrad 1997 Social Politics 284-286. 
71  Khedher 2017 JIWS 31. 
72  Weideman 2016 IJMES 47-65. 
73  Sfeir 1957 Middle East J 309-318. 
74  Code of Personal Status, 1956, Book 1 Marriage, aa 1-11. 
75  Code of Personal Status, 1956, Book 1 Marriage, aa 1-11. 
76  Code of Personal Status, 1956, Book 1 Marriage, aa 1-11. 
77  Code of Personal Status, 1956, Book 1 Marriage, aa 1-11. 
78  Code of Personal Status, 1956, Book 1 Marriage, aa 1-11. 
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The CPS of 1956 now requires that the parties must be of a certain age. For 
males the prescribed age is 18 years old and for females 15 years of age.79 
In Islam there is no prescribed marital age, except that the parties must have 
reached physical maturity. In addition, the marriage of either party below the 
legislated age shall be subject to special authorisation by a judge. The 
authorisation shall be given only upon proof of the attainment of physical 
maturity.80 The difference of age by gender in the CPS could constitute a 
distortion relating to the relevant bargaining power of the parties involved, 
and could result in a marriage contract which is advantageous to one party, 
leaving the other party in a vulnerable position.81  
One has to be careful, as many other factors could also lead to one of the 
parties’ being vulnerable. For example, if the female is 15 years old she may 
not be aware of her options, and she may be inexperienced in the art of 
negotiating, being too dependent on the advice of the family, who may not 
necessarily have the girl’s interest or well-being at heart.82 But we must be 
careful not to underestimate the maturity that young people have.83 In 
addition, the prohibition of marriage between blood relations is an important 
constraint to marriage.84 The impediments of a temporary nature are the 
existence of third-party rights in the marriage or the iddah (referred to as the 
reconciliation period, which applies only to the woman and not to the man).85 
Polygamy has always been a highly contentious issue in an Islamic context. 
According to the CPS, polygamy is prohibited. Marrying more than one 
woman shall incur a punishment of one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 
240,000 Francs, or either of these.86 Not surprisingly, the Tunisian 
traditionalists were deeply unsatisfied with this particular interpretation and 
argued that the Qur'anic verse requiring the equal treatment of wives had 
always been regarded as a moral suggestion.87 The traditionalist argument 
was that the verse clearly referred only to the financial treatment of wives 
and other similar equalities, subject to human competence. Bourguiba's 
understanding was thus deemed to be in direct conflict with the traditional 
interpretation of the practice of polygamy.88 Although some have argued 
that article 18 did not render polygamous marriages invalid but merely 
instituted secular sanctions,89 the Minister of Justice, Al Snousi, at that time 
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81  Jansen 2007 Nw U J Int'l Hum Rts 208. 
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87  Bonderman 1996 Harv L Rev 1169-1185. 
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stood firm in the conviction that the equal treatment of wives was 
impossible.90 Inferences could be drawn from the barring of polygamy that 
Tunisia had indirectly or directly rejected the idea that women are to be 
deemed possessions and/or symbols enhancing the social, economic or 
political status of men. In addition, by outlawing polygamy, Tunisia might 
well have ensured a degree of psychological comfort and stability for women 
who might otherwise live in fear that their husbands might marry a second, 
third or fourth wife. 
Of concern was article 23 of the 1956 CPS, which stipulates that the wife 
must fulfill her matrimonial duties "in conformity with usages and custom".91 
Article 23 thus implied acceptance of pre-modern Islamic jurists' thinking 
that a wife must accede to the husband's sexual demands in the absence 
of a valid excuse. Mayer, a legal scholar, correctly points out that there was 
no stipulation that mutual affection should be the foundation for marital 
attachment or that cohabitation could be interpreted as the spouses' mutual 
obligation.92 
Book II of the 1956 CPS deals with divorce. Article 30 stipulates that no 
divorce shall take place save before the court.93 Furthermore, divorce 
procedures may be undertaken by both husband and wife, and the 
supporting reasons are to be found in the CPS.94 In addition, the court shall 
determine the financial indemnity to which the wife may be entitled by way 
of damages, or the indemnity which she has to pay the husband.95 In 
addition, the court must investigate the cause of the dispute which failed to 
bring about reconciliation between the parties.96 The court is also 
empowered to take all measures which will ensure the accommodation of 
the spouses, their maintenance and the upbringing of the children. From the 
above, the inference may be drawn that the accommodation of the spouses 
and the well-being of the children is very important.97 It is of note that the 
well-being of the child in the context of a divorce has recently become 
paramount in legislation in most developing and developed countries. 
Apart from the modification of shariah law, the government had to reconcile 
legal disputes that arose among the Muslim citizens. While judges of the 
Hanafi and Maliki schools of religious thought (judges are referred to as 
qadis in Arab and Middle Eastern states) continued to exist side by side 
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during the Ottoman Empire and before the codification of Tunisia's family 
law, the simultaneous existence of these two competitive jurisdictions could 
no longer be justified once independence had been achieved. In an effort to 
find a solution, Tunisia abolished the shariah courts, and disputes relating 
to family law were now to be adjudicated before the national courts.98 
5  Amendments to Code of Personal Status post-1956 
This part of the article addresses the latest amendments to the CPS in the 
realisation of women-friendly rights in Tunisia. The CPS has been revised 
several times since 1956. Only the latest revisions will be discussed here 
as they relate to marriage and divorce.  
Article 3, which was revised in 2007, now states that marriage is formed 
only by the free will of the parties. Furthermore, it now requires the bride to 
be present at the site of the place of the marriage contract and to expressly 
direct her opinion to the marriage.99 The position of a matrimonial guardian 
has been abolished. The law no longer sanctions arranged or forced 
marriages of parties of either gender. The law currently strips away the legal 
prerogative of the father or guardian to commit a man or a woman to 
marriage against their will.100 The marital age of both parties has been set 
at eighteen years of age.101 Moreover, the CPS indicates that the marriage 
can be concluded only before two notaries or an officer of the civil registry, 
and the marriage must be registered with the civil authorities.102 A certificate 
delivered by the civil registry, or by the two notaries after they have 
performed the marriage, has now become the only valid proof of marriage. 
This is an attempt to eliminate secret marriages. 
Article 5, revised in 2007, reads that someone who has not attained the age 
of eighteen years cannot marry. Below this age, the marriage cannot be 
contracted except with the special permission of a judge, who will grant such 
permission only for serious reasons and in the best interest of the child.103 
According to Chekir, the age limit prevents early marriages, which permit 
sexual intercourse between partners when they are still physically or 
mentally immature. This change also helps to delay motherhood, thereby 
reducing the number of children under the age of 20 years, who presently 
make up 50 per cent of the population.104 Furthermore, it may be argued 
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that premature childbearing before full physical maturity has the potential to 
affect the reproductive and sexual health of women.105 Early childbearing 
may also prove to be an obstacle for women who wish to further their 
education and want to pursue a profession, not discounting the emotional 
and psychological impact this may have on them. These issues may also 
affect the male, who might not be ready to take on parental responsibilities 
and may thus put the burden on the woman. 
In addition, medical certificates of the good health of both spouses are 
mandatory. This is an effort to prevent venereal or sexually transmitted 
contagious diseases, and to protect the physical and emotional well-being 
of the child, the wife and the husband.106 The medical test results are to be 
provided to the parties without delay. In the past the provision of these test 
results took as many as three days.107 However, in a rural setting these tests 
may take longer to due to bribery and corruption.108 These violations occur 
despite the fact that this law had been in place for the past fifty years, 
requiring that a “free” pre-marital medical test be performed by public clinics 
as well as public hospitals prior to the marriage ceremony. 
According to an Association des journalistes d' information sur les religions 
(ARIJ) report relating to the pre-marital testing, there are certain 
shortcomings. For example, doctors are meant to issue certificates after the 
couple performs a number of legally required tests. If this is not performed, 
the law does not impose any punitive measures on the doctor.109 
Furthermore, if the doctor complies with the necessary provisions of the law, 
his role is limited to only informing the parties of a potential condition (which 
the test has highlighted) and issuing a warning of any consequences that 
may be relevant to the child or the wife.110 Although the doctor has the 
authority to withhold the certificate or postpone issuing it to a later date, this 
barrier is circumvented by simply going to another doctor in another area.111 
In order to combat these shortcomings the state has introduced legislation 
which states “that any person knowingly infected with a communicable 
disease (a venereal disease) who goes out of his way to pass along this 
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disease to another person shall be punished with imprisonment for a period 
ranging between one and three years.”112 
Article 2 of the 1956 CPS,113 on the breach of the promise of marriage, was 
modified by Law No. 93-97 of 12 July 1993, which states that "each of the 
two fiancés shall have the right to the restitution of gifts given to each other 
except in the case of breach of promise or a stipulation to the contrary."114 
Article 12 relates to the dowry and states that it may consist of any lawful 
property having monetary value and it shall now belong to the wife. In 
contrast, the previous wording of article 12 relating to dowry provided that 
only the fiancé or the husband had the right to the repayment of any gifts 
given to the fiancée or wife.  
A revised article 23 concentrates on mutuality, requiring both spouses to be 
kind to one another, to maintain a good relation, and to avoid harming each 
other.115 They are to work together to manage the home, raise the children, 
and provide for their needs. According to Mayer, the language of the CPS 
closely resembles the modern French Civil Code, article 213, which 
stipulates that the spouses together are to ensure the moral and material 
direction of the family, provide for the education of the children and their 
preparation for the future.116 The old language of the CPS relating to article 
23 of the 1956 version, requiring the wife to acknowledge the husband's 
prerogatives and to show obedience, was abolished.117 
Article 23, however, still refers to the husband as the head of the family, 
raising serious questions of interpretation. On the question of interpretation, 
Mayer puts forward the following, that perhaps the husband's status as the 
head of the household could be interpreted to mean that he retains decision-
making prerogatives and that the wife should defer to his wishes.118 Or 
perhaps it may reflect the primary responsibility that he has to provide for 
his family according to his means.119 Furthermore, article 23 directs the wife 
to contribute, too, if she has money.120 The provision stipulating that the wife 
must fulfil her conjugal duty in conformity with custom and usages was 
revised in 1993. The revised provision requires that both parties fulfil their 
duties in conformity with the custom and usages of the pre-independence 
family structure.121 The reforms to the CPS certainly advance the 
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progressive realisation of the equal rights coupled with the equal 
responsibilities of the spouses.122 This means that the wife plays an active 
role in the family as a generator of economic resources. Commenting on the 
revised provisions of article 23, Grami states that Tunisian women do not 
only have rights equal with those of their male counterparts, but also equal 
responsibilities in monetary terms.123 
Before 1956 unilateral repudiation, which had been a widespread Muslim 
tradition, allowed the husband to divorce his wife with impunity, and 
freely.124 The CPS has changed the regulations relating to divorce in a 
progressive manner. The improvements have abolished repudiation.125 The 
term "repudiation" appears nowhere in the text of the CPS. A divorce can 
take only place in court.126 There are three possibilities for divorce: a mutual 
divorce agreement of both spouses, or at the request of one spouse 
because of harm to which that spouse has been subjected, or at the request 
of the husband.127 
When a divorce is granted, the woman can demand compensation for any 
wrongs to which she has been subjected.128 She has a right to an allowance, 
payable monthly in arrears, which depends on the standard of living to which 
she was accustomed during the marriage, it may also be payable as a single 
capital sum.129 Furthermore, women with the custody of the children of the 
marriage have the right to child support, and an alimony fund was also 
established by the state in 1993, which ensures payments to divorced 
women and their children in cases where the husband neglects his duties. 
Article 19 of the CPS states that a man is forbidden to marry his "triply-
divorced wife" (where the husband pronounces the divorce three times in 
one sitting - for example, the husband says to his wife, "you are divorced 
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thrice"),130 and article 14 describes "triple divorce" as a permanent 
impediment to marriage.131 There has been considerable controversy over 
the interpretation of these provisions, and it not certain whether a triply-
divorced wife can marry her former husband, even if the resulting bar has 
been removed in accordance with the procedure described by law.132 
6  2017 Reforms 
On September 14 2017, in a speech by the Tunisian president Beji Caid 
Essebsi, the Tunisian government put an end to the ban (a 44-year ban 
imposed in 1973) on inter-religious marriages between Tunisian Muslim 
females and non-Muslim males.133 During this speech on national Women's 
Day he proposed amendments relating to the provisions governing the rule 
of inheritance and marital contracts.134 In an Islamic context parties are 
permitted to contract a marriage with members of other religions, but those 
not of the Muslim faith must accept Islam as their new faith for the marriage 
to be valid. When a woman contracts a marriage to a person of another 
faith, it is the other person that must embrace Islam as his new faith. 
However, there are scholars that argue that Muslims are permitted to marry 
only a partner of the same faith.135 In addition, the President proposed the 
removal of a bar that prevents inter-religious marriages between Muslim 
women and non-Muslim men. It has always been legal for men to marry 
outside their religion.136 
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The announcement by the President has received widespread 
condemnation among religious groups, who suggest that these latest 
provisions are in direct opposition to Islamic law, as it is Islamic law that 
prevails over family matters. These religious groups contend that these 
latest provisions allowing inter-religious marriages and the granting of equal 
portions of inheritance to females conflict with the Quran and the main 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence.137 For example, Egypt's Al Azhar 
institution, the world's foremost seat of religious learning for Sunni Muslims, 
swiftly rejected the Tunisian proposals. Its president, Abbas Shoman, Al 
Azhar's second most senior cleric, stated that calls for the equality of men 
and women in inheritance do an injustice to women, do not do women any 
good, and clash with shari'ah. As for the reforms in marriage law, Abbas 
Shoman argued that while Muslim men were likely to respect the beliefs and 
freedom of worship of their non-Muslim spouses, non-Muslim men were 
unlikely to do the same for their Muslim wives.138 
However, those supporting the President argue that this approach to inter-
religious marriages and women’s inheritance aligns itself with article 21 of 
2014 Tunisian Constitution.139 Article 21 provides that "all citizens, male or 
female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without 
any discrimination." Since the Arab uprising and coupled with Tunisia's 
progressive gender-friendly laws, there has been a debate amongst various 
sectors of the community as to the relationship between the written law and 
the day-to-day operation of the law. One explanation (there could be others) 
for the lack of the successful implementation of the new law is that perhaps 
it represents a too big a break with the past.140 What must change besides 
the law is the attitude of the people (especially those in authority) and their 
willingness to enforce and sustain the change. In most countries where 
change has occurred, there are those who fight to retain the old way of life, 
hanging onto the past without giving the new a chance to flourish. 
In the arena of inter-faith marriages, the application of law is generally 
represented as an example of its inability to align itself with social change.141 
Although the CPS does not include in its provisions impediments to religious 
marriage, the jurisprudence (fiqh) is generally interpreted to prohibit the 
marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. This has led to 
civil servants and judges pronouncing inter-faith marriages as null and 
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void.142 Evidence of this practice is to be found in two circulaires (decrees) 
of 1962 and 1973 aimed at civil servants to extract information of official 
conversion to Islam (official evidence from the state; mufti – Islamic 
jurisprudence scholar),143 if the husband is a non-Muslim, that he has 
converted.144 
The National Institute of Statistics (al-ma' had al-watan li al-ihsa) indicates 
that 30,000 Tunisian women emigrated from Tunisia in 2004 in order to 
marry.145 The existence of such conditions could have the potential to lead 
to viewing contracting a marriage with a foreigner as the best possible way 
of bypassing the existing law. The question which Tunisian women now face 
is whether the government should play a more definite role on who its 
people chose to marry, or should it merely act as an arbiter in contractual 
marital disputes.146 
Although Tunisia is viewed by many as the vanguard of gender-friendly 
laws, it stands as a nation of contradictions relating to the law and social 
change. It seems that the new democratic atmosphere has created a new 
discourse relating to inter-faith marriages. Municipalities across Tunisia 
have adopted different stances, some allowing inter-faith marriages and 
others refusing to register such marriages.147 Inferences may be drawn from 
the above, that those municipalities148 that reject inter-faith marriages are 
clinging to a conservative interpretation of the CPS, thereby not allowing 
constitutional change to influence their decisions, or perhaps their stance 
could be linked to the resurgence of Islamist or Salafism influences to which 
they have allegiance. Those allowing inter-faith religious marriages are 
guided by and enforcing the constitutional provisions of the new Tunisian 
Constitution of 2014. Whatever the reason or reasons, Tunisia is facing new 
conflict relating to inter-faith marriages. One can but hope that the newly 
enacted Tunisian Constitution will influence the national law, that the 
constitutional provisions will be allowed to filter down to the local law, and 
that the enforcement of the law will take place, thereby eradicating the 
possible lacuna between the written law and the law in practice. This is also 
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in line with article 46 of the Constitution, which reads "the state commits to 
protect women's accrued rights and works to strengthen and develop those 
rights" and that “the state guarantees the equality of opportunities between 
women and men to have access to all levels of responsibilities in all 
domains."149 
7  Conclusion 
Despite the modernisation of the legislation relating to women's rights, 
remnants of the old patriarchal structures exist, and the cultural tendency to 
hold that males are superior to females is a reality. This may not be evident 
in the major cities of Tunisia, but is perhaps more prevalent in the outlying 
cities, where this patriarchal structure is difficult to dismantle. Furthermore, 
tension exists between the notion of gender equality and religious identity 
that encourages traditional division along gender roles. In particular, in the 
realm of the family, for example, the CPS gives Tunisian women the right to 
negotiate their marital contract, but in practice social pressure influences 
the exercise of this right more than the law.150 
Generally, the recognition and understanding of the continuously changing 
nature of Islamic teachings, coupled with the evolving nature of the shari'ah, 
can arm activists with information for use in countering patriarchal and 
discriminatory discourses relating to women's rights, roles and duties.151 
Evidence of the evolving nature of the shari’ah and the existence of the 
counter-narratives is the change of atmosphere, which has pushed Tunisia 
into adopting a more expansive constitution, which to a greater or lesser 
extent accommodates gender equality. 
Although, Tunisia has since independence leaned towards modernity and 
struggled to make a complete break from the past and embrace modernity 
in totality, there is definitely an increasing change in the prevailing gender 
roles. Evidence of this is to be found in marriage patterns which no longer 
reflect family needs but rather the wants and desires of the individuals, and 
the changing relationship between society and the individual. However, the 
more expansive 2014 constitutional provisions, which embrace modernity 
and the individual seem sometimes not to be understood or enforced, 
especially in outlying districts, where remnants of the old patriarchal 
structures seem to be playing a more practical role. In addition, Tunisia 
seems to be fighting a new battle or perhaps an old battle, which has 
                                            
149  Nadhif 2017 https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/equality-in-
inheritance-raises-controversy-in-tunisia.html 1-4. 
150  Nadhif 2017 https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/equality-in-
inheritance-raises-controversy-in-tunisia.html 1-4. 
151  Mashhour 2005 Hum Rts Q 562-596.  
A BOOLEY  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  22 
become more prominent, about religious identity and the identity of the 
person. When there is a transition from the old to the new, there will always 
be areas of concern and contention. However, Tunisia must be 
complimented and encouraged to enforce the constitutional provisions, 
which have created an atmosphere in which gender equality is fostered in 
the context of the family. 
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